GOPY
Re: Nichey nicheness.
Since some of my work will now involve conflict studies relating to neuropsychology, you can expect to find more posts in this area. Most of you already know about this, so I feel dropping a few bread crumbs about what the hell I’m up to, might be fun. To that end, the February 11th ed. of Time Magazine has a decent introductory overview on drones and manages to squeeze in a few words that cut into a specific research interest of mine:
Drones bring that asymmetrical dynamic out into the real world: a drone is the physical avatar of the virtual presence of a real person. They provoke a new kind of anxiety, quiet unlike the nuclear terror of the 1980s or the conspiracy-theory paranoia of the 1990s. They’re a swarming persistent presence, low-level but ubiquitous and above all anonymous. [via]
Above: A sample of unmanned aerial vehicles, including the LEMV (1), which can hover for weeks at a time, or the Seafox (5) which hunts and destroys floating mines, the Raven (6) which can deliver real time intel or the Nano (2) equipped with a tiny camera weighing only 19 grams.
If you have anything similar you’d like to share, the inbox is now open.
[Img src Time, Feb 11, 2012, print ed., via].
Q: “Do animals get mental illnesses, just like humans? Or is your dog just dumb?”
A: Gawker’s Hey Science fields this one out to a few experts - a vet behaviorist, a Prof. of vet biosciences, vet neurologist and emergency vet all give an answer… and here’s the rub:
Animals do suffer from mental illnesses. Caveats: 1) not necessarily the same mental illnesses as humans, and 2) diagnosis of animal mental illness is based on animal behavior, a trickier task than the diagnosis of mental illness in humans. If you want to get your pet’s mental illness diagnosed, go to a certified veterinary behaviorist, not a bullshit “pet psychologist.” [via, IMG]
wnyc:
Is There A Place For The Mind In Physics?
So I want you to do something for me. I want you to think of a blue monkey. Are you ready? OK, go! Visualize it in your head. Any kind of monkey will do (as long as it’s blue). Take a moment. Really, see the little blue dude! Got it? Great. Now, here is the question: Where did that thought fit into reality? How was it real? Where was it real?
Another way to ask this question is: Was the “blue monkey thought” just the electrical activity of your neurons? Was that all there was to it? If not, might your private internal screening of the blue monkey be something altogether different? Was it, perhaps, part of something just as fundamental as quarks and Higgs bosons?
This is the fundamental question behind philosopher Thomas Nagel’s controversial book: ”Mind & Cosmos: Why The Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False”. I’ve been slowly making my way through Nagel’s short (though, at points, dense) volume for a few months now. Back in October our own most excellent philosopher of Mind, Alva Noe, presented his own take on Nagel’s work. Yesterday, Tania Lombrozo extracted some real-world questions out of Nagel’s philosophy. Today I want to begin thinking a bit about what and where the Mind might be in relation to my own science of physics. CONTINUED.
UmYuss. But not really.

200 plays
Are you made of stone
A couple of British researchers just possibly enhanced (complicated) my empathy research jam. Good news: circuitry clarification. Meh news: more scales please! CheersThanksaLot.
Most empathy research in the forensic context has assumed that empathy has two components. In this two-component model, the cognitive component involves perspective taking, and the affective component involves experiencing appropriate emotion. (…) this assumption has both dominated and limited empathy research with offenders, nearly all of which has been conducted with sexual offenders. We propose instead that five components are involved in the experience of empathy: perspective taking, the ability to experience emotion, a belief that others are worthy of compassion and respect, situational factors, and an ability to manage personal distress. We suggest that the non-situational factors that blocked empathy for the victim at the time of a sexual offense are probably other dispositions known to be related to sexual offending, such as sexual preoccupation, generalized hostility to others, implicit theories about children and sex, and/or poor coping with negative emotions. [via. IMG]
“…psychopathy is best conceptualized as a neurodevelopmental disorder.”
Dr. Kent Kiehl is on this team which means a few things: it’s gonna be about fMRI, it’s gonna be about an incarcerated population or psychopaths and I should have contacted him a long time ago about how to be awesome. This study looks at the relationship of brain volumes in the paralimbic & limbic areas and psychopathic traits in male adolescents to see if they are the same as previously observed in incarcerated adult males. They found that:
Consistent with hypotheses and the adult literature, psychopathic traits (..cough cough) were associated with decreased regional gray matter volumes in diffuse paralimbic regions, including orbitofrontal cortex, bilateral temporal poles, and posterior cingulate cortex.
Blues check: The above composite from their study, shows gray matter volumes significantly associated with Total Psychopathy Checklist–Youth Version scores, increases are in yellow-oranges and decreases are in blue. This is a fascinating link to make regarding a disorder that is usually considered a personality disorder.
We would, it seems, be justified in imprisoning or institutionalizing them for such an act to prevent them from harming others. But the other justifications for punishment – retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence – seem not to apply very well. By definition, a prison sentence couldn’t deter an individual from doing something he can’t stop himself from doing and rehabilitation could not change an immutable characteristic. Retribution would be even more problematically incoherent. We believe that a man must be able to do what he ought to do; we could not condemn a man for doing something that we believe he cannot choose not to do.
Drones Reimagined: Startup Plans Medical Supply Drone Network
Matternet has a vision of creating a network of autonomous flying drones that can deliver medical and other vital supplies to regions that either do not have access to such things, or find getting them tough. The drone network would serve areas with no serviceable road access, or places that have been devastated by natural disasters or war.
Full Story: InQuid
Autonomy/economy: 150 drones at $900k, $0.24 per flight.
Is It Time to Treat Violence Like a Contagious Disease?
…exposure to violence is conceptually similar to exposure to, say, cholera or tuberculosis. Acts of violence are the germs. Instead of wracking intestines or lungs, they lodge in the brain. When people, in particular children and young adults whose brains are extremely plastic, repeatedly experience or witness violence, their neurological function is altered.
Cognitive pathways involving anger are more easily activated. Victimized people also interpret reality through perceptual filters in which violence seems normal and threats are enhanced. People in this state of mind are more likely to behave violently. Instead of through a cough, the disease spreads through fights, rapes, killings, suicides, perhaps even media, the researchers argue. (…) “The underlying theme is learned behavior”…
(…) Such dynamics might sound almost mechanistic, as if violence could be considered in isolation from all the other factors — poverty, drugs, demographics, policing — that shape the society in which it occurs. That’s absolutely not the case, but neither are these factors solely responsible for violence outbreaks. [via]
Violence-as-contagion? Might as well talk about frequency syncing.
So there’s an article about using neuroscientific evidence to mitigate sentencing of criminals who are diagnosed as psychopaths, by a law professor, specializing in criminal law who has a LLM from Columbia. Great. So, I was going to toss a link and note the usual discrepancies I found within the paper. But swear to god, I feel like law reviews rarely make the distinction between clinical psychopaths and those having psychopathic traits, which leaves a lot of room to argue whatever point they are making. The current research is such that it’s imperative to make these clarifications, especially when talking about criminal offenders since the majority of psychopaths aren’t violent nor criminal. I’m just gonna keep truckin with my spectrum theory, thanks.
This Note addresses whether criminals law’s assumptions about “free will” might be undermined and transformed by modern science. Existing scholarship has focused on the assumptions about human freedom that underlie substantive criminal law doctrine and foundational theories of punishment. In contrast, I explore the points of discretion in the criminal justice system, where key actors in the sentencing process are authorized to make moral determinations outside of the ordinary doctrinal framework. I observe that discretionary moral adjudication in the criminal justice system contains implicit judgments about human agency, and reflects folk beliefs about free will. In particular, key sentencing actors bring a distorted view of human agency to bear on their sentencing decisions. This distorted view results in a moral blind spot, disabling adjudicators from moral inferences that militate in favor of restraint in sentencing. Hence, I argue, modern science could have a corrective moral influence on criminal law, by fostering amongst key sentencing actors a more realistic view of human behavior.
“…could have”…that’s known as strong support in my neck of the woods. And talking about what the law considers realistic human behavior is fascinating… in that it’s like a dark Grimm fairy tale.
- I Cannot Tell a Lie by Adrienne Anifant in John Jay’s JusticeMatters, Fall 2012 …which just arrived in the mail a few days ago. (I’ve said it a hundred times, amazing faculty [srsly, none better] but the admin could use a trailer load of help.)
Fascinating article about Professor Maria Hartwig’s work towards the effectiveness of interrogation techniques based on “embodied cognition” and new approaches for detecting deception which seek to, “…reduce false accusations, wrongful convictions, lengthy appeals and the concomitant stress and anxiety to the accused and their families.” Her recent work is funded by the FBI/High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group. Clearly, I’d love to meet her. So maybe I WILL. Operation cold email awesome people in effect. Boom.
“To BD or not to BD: functional neuroimaging and the boundaries of bipolarity”
Bipolar disorders are major mood disorders defined by the presence of discrete episodes of depression and either mania, in bipolar I disorder, or hypomania, in bipolar II disorder. There is little contention that both are serious psychiatric conditions or that they are associated with substantial suffering, disability, risk of suicide and cost to the community. Recently, focus has shifted away from classic manic-depressive illness toward a ‘bipolar spectrum’ model, which allows for much softer presentations to be conceptualized as bipolarity, but the boundaries of this concept remain contentious. In this article, we will consider the contribution of neuroimaging to delineating the bipolar phenotype and differentiating it from similar disorders. [via]
Prediction: this model will be the case one day with psychopathy and other one card shark conditions, maybe not the next revision of the DSM…but eventually.
One of [Roberta’s] most appealing qualities is, perhaps, her friendly impulse to help others … .She often went to sit with an ill neighbor, watched the baby of her mother’s friend, and rather patiently helped her younger sister with her studies. In none of these things was she consistent. She often promised her services and, with no explanation, failed to appear … .She would stop to pet a puppy, take crumbs out to the birds, and comfort a stray cat. Yet, when her own dog was killed by an automobile, she showed only the most fleeting and superficial signs of concern.
Psychopathy in Women, in Handbook of Psychopathy [via]
One of these things is not like the other, in that only one is real.