"Cross-Cultural Variation and fMRI Lie-Detection"
Welcome to a paper I’ll be referencing IRL. I was actually fighting with myself last night about populations to use for my fMRI study (I don’t want to use college students, since my study isn’t about college students), which Bruni brings up in the abstract:
On several basic features of perception and cognition, Western university students turn out to be outliers relative to the general human population, so that data based on them should be interpreted with caution.
So, I’m really glad I have this paper to base my request of special population off of now…since I’m not sure how easy it will be getting access to the population I need.
So big up to Tommaso Bruni, former ‘guest list neighbor’ at the Neuroethics and Law Blog! From Bruni’s conclusion:
The long and the short of this paper is that cross-cultural experiments on fMRI lie-detection should be performed before this technique enters courts, because the lab experiments with US citizens risk having an unacceptably low external validity. As a matter of fact, I suggest the technique cannot live up to the Daubert standards without such checks, because no error rate calculated in the lab can be projected onto real life without them. I do not take any position about the ethical acceptability of fMRI lie-detection, but argue that more neuroscientific research is needed (not only in the cross-cultural field) in order to assess its full potential both legally and morally. I therefore encourage and endorse more funding for fMRI lie-detection research. Only sound and carefully conducted empirical research can lead to new forensic technologies that can be useful to ascertain the truth and to justly determine legal proceedings. (via)
I ABSOLUTELY agree with him on why (technically) lie detection isn’t ready for courts.
Hey look internet, I agree with someone!
![Since for the next month, I’ll be guest blogging over at the Neuroethics & Law Blog, I thought I might introduce one of Adam Kolber’s papers that really caught my interest a while ago.
In his essay “THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF PUNISHMENT” published in the Columbia Law Review, Kolber points out a few of the gaping holes in the theory of retributive punishment. This is the popular mindset that criminals should get their just deserts for the crime they’ve committed. However, for some prisoners, the punishment may not fit the crime by way of subjective experience - meaning some will experience the same sentence harsher than another in the exact situation.
Two main points that highlight ”a disconnect between the way that we ought to understand punishment severity and the way that we typically assess punishment severity for sentencing purposes” are:
we should take into consideration the prisoner’s subjective experience of the severity of the punishment
we have an obligation to anticipate the punishment experience at sentencing the same way we calculate emotions distress in civil matters.
Obviously the former asks us to peer into the future (which we do anyway at risk assessments which contribute to sentencing) where the latter often has empirical evidence from which to gage a proper course. That begs the question: how do we make this assessment of what the degree of subjective severity will be? Execute research, develop a test tool, have experts interpret it at hearings? Okay.
Now who gets access to this? I say the most vulnerable populations in prison: youths, drug addicts, mentally ill, transgendered/gay, physically disabled, blind, deaf [I wonder how gang related would fit in here]) anyone who would have to psychologically endure a harsher punishment just by the act of being in prison or surrounded by an insensitive/aggressive population. Why do we just assume any extra abuse or suffering experienced in prison is justifiable and “part of the deal?” Also the length of the sentence should be a tip off, any term over a certain amount of years that potentially involve someone with diminished capacity (or not?), should be up for review as well. As we are aware, certain prison conditions even for a person of average intelligence and average ability can lead to mental illness and brain atrophy in the most sever cases, such as administrative segregation units or in SHU’s. This doesn’t include any physical or sexual abuse that may occur on top of that. Further this leads to reconsider reprimands that happen to inmates once they have broken rules inside prison.
What we are talking about is this: it is not a just punishment if some experiences it to a harsher degree than another in the same situation, it is not a just punishment if the residual effects of prison extend the term, as the case with voting and job acquisition and it is not a just punishment if it inflicts psychological conditions such as depression, PTSD, delusions, panic or uncontrollable emotional problems rage, etc. I’m not talking about inconveniences, I’m talking about damage that has extended repercussions on the outside leading to outrageous recidivism rates or escalated violent tendencies, broken homes, wrecked communities and trickle-down generational effects.
Adam Kolber is careful not argue for lighter sentences for persons considered sensitive to the environment of prison (pleasing consequentialists everywhere) however, the above recognition is an acutely important factor in sentence reformation and something that the forensic psychology field has been supporting for a long time in terms of considering the individual’s mental health. It’s refreshing and inspiring to see this call be answered by the legal community in a cautious, yet forward thinking manner.
Full article here.
Here’s just 5 reasons why this paper is more important then most people realize:
1) It brings attention to unjust sentencing practices that although may be an unintentional extension of appropriate and legal punishment, have been not only accepted, but expected, i.e., abuse and housing conditions.
2) It manages to discuss prisoners/human rights issues without the bleeding heart overtone which is an instant turn off to the majority of our retributive society, gaining more attention from a wider audience.
3) It’s a slippery slope from this issue that considers the subjective psychological effects of punishment based on physical attributes to considering purely psychological (and long term) effects of prison. We can hardly do one without addressing the other.
4) People are ready for stronger voices from the legal community to join neuroscientists, bridging the gap between psychology and law, especially in the evolving discussion of punishment.
5) This paper preempts further work that should speak about the benefits of utilitarian punishment practices, rather than retributive. Just add the science and statistics. Bam. A great neurolaw topic that calls for experimental work to back it up.](http://i.cdn.turner.com/trutv/trutv.com/graphics/photos/gangsters_outlaws/cops_others/robert_elliott/3-1-Executioner-with-axe.jpg)
Since for the next month, I’ll be guest blogging over at the Neuroethics & Law Blog, I thought I might introduce one of Adam Kolber’s papers that really caught my interest a while ago.
In his essay “THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF PUNISHMENT” published in the Columbia Law Review, Kolber points out a few of the gaping holes in the theory of retributive punishment. This is the popular mindset that criminals should get their just deserts for the crime they’ve committed. However, for some prisoners, the punishment may not fit the crime by way of subjective experience - meaning some will experience the same sentence harsher than another in the exact situation.
Two main points that highlight ”a disconnect between the way that we ought to understand punishment severity and the way that we typically assess punishment severity for sentencing purposes” are:
- we should take into consideration the prisoner’s subjective experience of the severity of the punishment
- we have an obligation to anticipate the punishment experience at sentencing the same way we calculate emotions distress in civil matters.
Obviously the former asks us to peer into the future (which we do anyway at risk assessments which contribute to sentencing) where the latter often has empirical evidence from which to gage a proper course. That begs the question: how do we make this assessment of what the degree of subjective severity will be? Execute research, develop a test tool, have experts interpret it at hearings? Okay.
Now who gets access to this? I say the most vulnerable populations in prison: youths, drug addicts, mentally ill, transgendered/gay, physically disabled, blind, deaf [I wonder how gang related would fit in here]) anyone who would have to psychologically endure a harsher punishment just by the act of being in prison or surrounded by an insensitive/aggressive population. Why do we just assume any extra abuse or suffering experienced in prison is justifiable and “part of the deal?” Also the length of the sentence should be a tip off, any term over a certain amount of years that potentially involve someone with diminished capacity (or not?), should be up for review as well. As we are aware, certain prison conditions even for a person of average intelligence and average ability can lead to mental illness and brain atrophy in the most sever cases, such as administrative segregation units or in SHU’s. This doesn’t include any physical or sexual abuse that may occur on top of that. Further this leads to reconsider reprimands that happen to inmates once they have broken rules inside prison.
What we are talking about is this: it is not a just punishment if some experiences it to a harsher degree than another in the same situation, it is not a just punishment if the residual effects of prison extend the term, as the case with voting and job acquisition and it is not a just punishment if it inflicts psychological conditions such as depression, PTSD, delusions, panic or uncontrollable emotional problems rage, etc. I’m not talking about inconveniences, I’m talking about damage that has extended repercussions on the outside leading to outrageous recidivism rates or escalated violent tendencies, broken homes, wrecked communities and trickle-down generational effects.
Adam Kolber is careful not argue for lighter sentences for persons considered sensitive to the environment of prison (pleasing consequentialists everywhere) however, the above recognition is an acutely important factor in sentence reformation and something that the forensic psychology field has been supporting for a long time in terms of considering the individual’s mental health. It’s refreshing and inspiring to see this call be answered by the legal community in a cautious, yet forward thinking manner.
Here’s just 5 reasons why this paper is more important then most people realize:
1) It brings attention to unjust sentencing practices that although may be an unintentional extension of appropriate and legal punishment, have been not only accepted, but expected, i.e., abuse and housing conditions.
2) It manages to discuss prisoners/human rights issues without the bleeding heart overtone which is an instant turn off to the majority of our retributive society, gaining more attention from a wider audience.
3) It’s a slippery slope from this issue that considers the subjective psychological effects of punishment based on physical attributes to considering purely psychological (and long term) effects of prison. We can hardly do one without addressing the other.
4) People are ready for stronger voices from the legal community to join neuroscientists, bridging the gap between psychology and law, especially in the evolving discussion of punishment.
5) This paper preempts further work that should speak about the benefits of utilitarian punishment practices, rather than retributive. Just add the science and statistics. Bam. A great neurolaw topic that calls for experimental work to back it up.
